

Psychodrama and the Future of the Social Sciences

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This article originally appeared in the journal *Group Psychotherapy and Psychodrama* in 1974, just after the death of Jonathan's father.

The article provides a brilliantly written brief history of the historical development of the social sciences, placing psychodrama within a phenomenological epistemology, which is interested more "in the essence of psychical phenomenon, and not in the facts purely as such." Psychodrama is interested in working with the "essence of perception," the author writes. "The person stands at the center of his intuited senses, the nucleus of his perceived world, about which revolves his social atom and his psychodramatic life-world." The author's thesis is that psychodramatic theory and practice represent a significant bridge between humanistic and behavioristic strategies in social sciences, then he boldly states that "it is the only bridge of this type extant in human society today." Even 37 years later, this article from the ASGPP Archive is significant today in its implications for the future of psychodrama and sociometry in social science theory, and it influences how we observe and participate together at a time when psychodramatic and sociometric theory and practice are needed more than ever.—*Adam M. Barcroft*

PSYCHODRAMA AND THE FUTURE OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES*

The new scientific environment within which psychodramatists must work demands an analysis of both the present status of the social sciences and an understanding of psychodrama's role in their progress. This matter cannot be

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answered in its totality here—indeed more questions may be raised by this discussion than answered—but it is long past the appropriate time for the initiation of such an inquiry. Our emphasis would be on placing psychodrama within the framework of contemporary events in the social sciences.

Many would argue that the current scientific era (the “paradigm,” to borrow T. S. Kuhn’s term) of a technological approach to science saw its first theoretical statement in the work of the French philosopher and mathematician René Descartes. Especially in his “Meditations on First Philosophy,” Descartes established a clear position opposed to the Aristotelian tradition dominant and sanctioned by the Church up to that time. Briefly Descartes accomplished his objective with the following steps:

- He pointed out the dubitability of information provided by the senses, and that they therefore could not provide the scientist with knowledge which is certain;
- he asserts that all he can be certain of is that he is thinking, and so at rock-bottom he knows this with certainty: that he is a thinking thing, and a thing which thinks; and
- he argues that this Mind, thinking-substance must clearly be different from the body-substance whose determination is unreliable.¹

In this ingenious manner, outlined all too inadequately above, Descartes creates the theory of the mind-body dichotomy which science ever since has used as its ontology, and most philosophical inquiry has taken as its method. According to Karl Popper this Cartesian “rationalism,” as it has been labeled, might be summed up in Hegel’s formulation “that which is reasonable must be real.” It was from this point that science went to Kant and the revolution of German “idealism,” which tried to synthesize empiricism (the notion that science must be ruled by observation and experimentation) with rationalism.²

Efforts to achieve a supposedly rigorous empirico-deductive approach probably reach their most extreme form in the social sciences through Skinnerian methodological behaviorism. It was the American psychologist and prophet of modern behaviorism, John B. Watson, who said:

Behavior’s challenge to introspective psychology was: you say there is such a thing as consciousness, that consciousness goes on in you—then prove it. You say that you have sensations, perceptions and images—then demonstrate them as the sciences demonstrate their facts.³

This extreme positivistic-objective approach which today dominates the social sciences is applied not only to the micro-social realm through behavioral

and experimental psychology, but is reflected in the current emphasis on statistical measurement and analysis as well. Further, this movement is doubtless making major inroads into the macro-social disciplines, such as Sociology and Anthropology. As early as 1949, Leslie A. White argued that the nature of individuals in human society is irrelevant to a study of human culture. She says "the most realistic and scientifically adequate interpretation of culture is one that proceeds as if human beings did not exist."⁴ Ignoring qualitative differences is characteristic of this positivistic approach.

Reactions to this view of science, which as we mentioned earlier has been evolving for at least three hundred years, have been varied. Early twentieth century existentialism was certainly in part an attack on extreme rationalism. Recently, Thomas Kuhn's historical analysis of the "real" way science progresses has given lie to the inadequacies of contemporary "naïve rationalism" (like that of Karl Popper). But perhaps most noteworthy of these alternative views consists in the transcendental phenomenology of Edmund Husserl.

In *The Crisis of the European Sciences*, a series of lectures given in 1935, Husserl develops his claim that modern scientific rationalism has moved so far afield of the day-to-day life world, the "Lebenswelt," that it has lost touch with the real "gut" issues of human life.

It ("rational" science) excludes in principle precisely the questions which man, given over in our unhappy time to the most portentous upheavals, finds the most burning: questions of the meaning or meaninglessness of the whole of this human existence. Do not these questions, universal and necessary for all men, demand universal reflections and answers based on the rational import?⁵

It is these two opposing streams in the contemporary philosophy of knowledge with which we shall next concern ourselves, especially as psychodrama pertains to them in its application. We will be particularly interested in the way psychodramatic theory and technique have been or could be associated with each approach in the social sciences.

The feeling among "traditional" researchers and practitioners in psychology, or among those who are merely informed, is that psychodrama rests wholly within a radically humanistic framework, and so it is inapplicable to therapeutic or research modes with a behavioral theory as a foundation. While the former statement is correct, the latter certainly does not and has not followed in fact.

Behavioral psychologists, when moving from the laboratory to the therapeutic environment, find that elementary techniques of positive reinforcement lose efficiency when applied to increasingly complex patterns of behavior in an individual, and when applied to intra-group relationships this is even more the case. This results in a tendency to employ techniques called "behavior modification" or

"role training," but the description and objectives of these methods belie their debt to psychodrama. A couple of examples will serve to illustrate this assertion.

In an article entitled "Reciprocal Inhibition as the Main Basis of Psycho-Therapeutic Effect," Dr. Joseph Wolpe discusses "assertion responses" in psychotherapy, which he defines as being "mainly employed in situations that occur spontaneously [strange word for a behaviorist!—auth.] in the normal course of the patient's life."⁶ Dr. Wolpe takes the example of treating a young man who feels hurt when criticized by members of his family, but is unable to express his pain and resentment due to socially induced, anxiety producing, guilt feelings. Reasoning that the problem is to get the patient to feel justified in expressing his resentment, the therapist proceeds to verbally clarify to the patient the fact that his parents have tied him up in his anxiety, and "informing him that, though expression of resentment may be difficult at the first, it becomes progressively easier with practice." Dr. Wolpe also says that some patients "need much initial exhortation and repeated promptings."⁷ Now this advice does not seem to give the therapist much with which to work: the key paragraph includes this passage:

Occasionally, when there is unusual difficulty in the expression of aggression in the life situation, it is helpful to initiate the patient by means of a kind of "psycho-drama" in the consulting room in which the therapist takes the role of some person who in life evokes anxiety in the patient.⁸

Of course, in *the role theoretic terms*, Dr. Wolpe had been doing psychodrama with this particular patient before he even actually mentioned the term, for in the act of encouraging him to display this resentment, the therapist had taken the role of an accepting, more permissive parent-authority figure. Admitting and proceeding along the lines of psychodramatic role playing from the beginning would seem to be a more fruitful way of obtaining the desired end.

In another article, "Reinforcement and Punishment in the Control of Human Behavior by Social Agencies," Dr. C. B. Ferster discusses the behavioral notion of "shaping" behavior. In an example, a male patient in college is incapable of even elementary social contact. Dr. Ferster instructs him first to say simply "good morning" to those he passes on the campus. The environment will certainly provide positive reinforcement to the young man's initial step and allow the therapist to proceed to more complex verbal commands such as "Could you please tell me the time?" also a behavior likely to be reinforced. Dr. Ferster continues:

Group therapy of psychodrama could also be adapted to the task of generating new performances as an intermediate step to be used between "office therapy" and exercises using outside environments accessible to the patient. Patients could use each other, under the direction of the therapist, to develop skills necessary

in normal social practice. The therapist would set tasks for each patient carefully graded so as to be within the range of existing behavioral repertoire.⁹

Although Dr. Ferster is describing nothing which has not been done in psychodramatic sessions for forty years at places like Beacon and St. Elizabeth's Hospital in Washington, D.C. (and despite the fact that many psychodramatists would question the rigidity of proceeding according to a behavioral repertoire), both he and Dr. Wolpe are to be commended for their knowledge of and reference to psychodramatic techniques. A survey of the literature of role training reveals that it is incredibly devoid of acknowledgement of clinical behaviorism's debt to psychodrama.

Pausing to consider the significance of this discussion, it is now most important to realize that psychodramatic technique, in spite of its unquestionably *humanistic-subjective* theoretical origins, can be so readily applied to a system of therapy which adheres to an opposing view of the nature of human psychology. This may be an indication of the spontaneity of psychodrama itself.

But a discussion of the application of psychodrama to positivistic ideals in social science would be incomplete without mention of sociometry, which has been embraced by social scientists for its ability to provide quantitative analysis of small group relations. Mary L. Northway's *A Primer of Sociometry* is an elegant introduction to the use of sociometric testing. Her table of contents indicates that sociometry obeys the standards of precision which behavioral social scientist are constantly exhorting each to obtain: "How to Design a Sociometric Test; How to Administer the Test; How to Organize the Results; What to Do With the Score; The Reliability and Validity of a Sociometric Test; How to Organize the Results Graphically; and, How to Interpret the Results," illustrates this point.¹⁰ In recent year such groups as the College Entrance Examination Board have come to utilize psychodrama's quantitative counterpart, as in their monograph entitled "Organizational Measurement and Its Bearing on the Study of College Environments." Other researchers of a traditional bent have done the same, as in the book *Social Pressure and Informal Groups* by Leon Festinger, Stanley Schacter, and Kurt Back, wherein sociograms are used to analyze increasingly complex inter-relationships: "By the use of some of the standard and relatively simple manipulations of matrix algebra we are able to analyze such things as sub-group formations, cliques, and inherent chains of influence from one person to another." This analysis technique is then applied to the sociometric data from the community under study."

There is no doubt but that the above cited projects (i.e., behavioral clinical psychology and quantitative analysis of group relations) represent approaches sanctioned by a *positivist perspective* in social science. Yet, they utilize a technique grounded in an essentially humanistic (that is, not demanding the "Cartesian" split between observer and that which is observed) philosophy of social

science—psychodrama.¹² If this much may be granted, we are entitled to state the thesis that *Psychodramatic theory and application represent a significant bridge between humanism and positivism in social science*. Indeed we might go so far as to argue that it is the only bridge of this type extant in human science today.

But we have not yet finished, for it remains for us to investigate the manner in which psychodramatic theory satisfies techniques in the social science not rooted in the rationalistic tradition. We have already referred to Husserl's exposition of the shortcomings of that tradition.

Much recent work in sociological theory has concerned itself both with alternatives to a simple statistical survey of subject communities and improvements upon such techniques as the participant-observer method. One such effort was conducted by Robert Redfield through his book *The Little Community*, in which he observed that it is especially difficult in the social sciences to separate the observer from the object of his study, and that even the most well-meaning scientist begins a project with certain preconceptions. Accordingly, it behooves the scientist to enter a community conscious that it may well have "more than one face," more than those qualities which appear to him to predominate. He advises his readers to enter such situations with a sort of polar set of mental constructions, ready to interpret his experience in more than a single way. For example, a visitor to a South American tribe should prepare himself to view it through the eyes of one who feels comfortable in and approves of this (let us imagine) highly competitive life-style, as well as someone who feels quite differently about the way the social contract should be written.¹³

The psychodramatic theorist would have several observations to make regarding Redfield's analysis. He would agree that the competent participant-observer must role reverse (prior to entering the community) with a colleague or colleagues who hold a different outlook than he on this particular group, so that he might better understand differing points of view.

But the psychodramatist would argue that it is important to be more than simply bi-polar in view. The key word is *spontaneity*; the spontaneous researcher is ready to adapt new approaches to old or expected observations, and adequate approaches to events in the community, which he might not have expected. Now Redfield's recommendation becomes multi-dimensional, for the researcher must be able to play not only several roles within himself, but also have enough spontaneity to role reverse with his subjects. This, after all, is a major point in participant-observation—to let the observer become so warmed-up to the situation under study that he actually views events through the eyes of a member of the community, while at the same time is able to apply appropriate interpretations based on his previously acquired training.

Also as a reaction to behavioral or statistical reduction, Paul Diesing in *Patterns of Discovery in the Social Sciences* espouses what he calls the Holistic standpoint:

(It) includes the belief that human systems tend to develop a characteristic wholeness or integrity. They are not simply a loose collection of traits or wants or reflexes or variables of any sort; they have a unity that manifests itself in nearly every part.¹⁴

Diesing in this volume examines a variety of instruments which meet the requisites of a Holist, because "mechanical recording devices are sensitive only to specific, isolated facts for which they have been programmed."¹⁵

Of special interest to us is his examination of the Case Study Method as a holistic device, and psychotherapy as an example of its practical use. It is worth repeating the following passage in its entirety.

The therapist's role varies on the inter-active dimension in different theories and cases. In older Freudian and in nondirective therapy, the therapist is a passive, even invisible listener, whose only task is to interpret the patient to himself. More usually the therapist helps by asking questions and thus joining in the search. Still more active therapists take a role that the patient offers out of this unconscious, thereby dramatically revealing the patient's inner life to himself. The patient's conception of the role and his reaction to it are revealed simultaneously, and he has an opportunity to reconstruct his conception and to practice new reactions. Role-playing is important in group therapy, and breaches an extreme in psychodrama, where the patient, the therapist, and assistants all play out the drama of the patient's unconscious life.¹⁶

The psychodramatist would point out that it is only on the psychodrama stage that the case under study reaches its real multi-dimensionality and vitality, but even with this proviso psychodrama's role in Diesing's paradigm is clear.

Though the above cited efforts are not motivated by a phenomenological theory, they nevertheless share with Husserl and his followers the criticism of the positivistic stream that we have previously discussed. That psychodramatic techniques have been appropriated by both sides we have already demonstrated, but it is surely with the non-positivistic, holistic, phenomenological group that psychodramatists ultimately identify themselves.

A provocative neo-phenomenological statement serves to emphasize the unique position psychodramatic theory and practice holds in the social sciences, and indicates wherein it will have increasing prominence. Dr. Roger Poole's essay, *Towards Deep Subjectivity*, articulates the inadequacies of scientific "objectivity" vis-à-vis the contemporary scene in science and society. But Poole complains that an adequate technique for applying "deep subjectivity" as an answer to traditional positivism has yet to surface. In what sounds like a call-to-arms for psychodramatists, he says:

Nevertheless, Husserl's indication about what is the vital *problem* of our time is still valid: it is the evolution of a subjective method which would take account of the perspectival world and of inter-subjectivity in the cultural and moral communities in which we live. This remains the major problem.¹⁷

Having indicated in the above brief survey several areas in which psychodramatic method is borrowed by both behavioral social scientists as well as humanistically oriented researchers, we reached a tentative conclusion that psychodramatic practice may indeed bridge the opposition between humanistic and behavioristic strategies in social science. In order to make this theory convincing, we are compelled to answer the following questions:

How is this quality in psychodrama to be understood; what theoretical features of psychodrama, if any, make it amenable to varied application; particularly, what theoretical *justification* do we have to make the claim that psychodrama deals successfully with the opposition between humanism and behaviorism? Until we have dealt with these issues our claim remains no more than that.

Let us now sketch the arguments we shall present to deal with these questions.

ARGUMENT I: The science of consciousness developed by Edmund Husserl and his followers, "phenomenology," trivializes the epistemological issues at the root of the humanistic-behavioristic debate;

ARGUMENT II: Psychodramatic therapy (group psychotherapy and psychodrama) and psychodramatic sociology (sociometry) are understandable as phenomenological enterprises. Moreover, psychodramatic epistemology is implicitly phenomenological. Parenthetically, it is also claimed the reverse holds, that psychodrama is the action phenomenology of the "life-world," that phenomenology is implicitly psychodramatic.

Therefore, given the proofs of the above arguments, the varied usage of psychodramatic practice is indeed comprehensible; and, properly applied, psychodrama eliminates the opposition between humanistic and behavioral psychology. Time does not permit a full-scale explanation, which this topic deserves and requires, but we can begin to outline the discussion in support of these claims.

Briefly, Husserlian epistemology was in part a reaction to the difficulty raised by Descartes with regard to the two sources of knowledge: interiority, introspection and involvement of the subject and subjective experience, to which the humanist refers; and exteriority, empirical data collected through the senses, to which the behaviorist refers. But the phenomenologist points out that our perceptions are constantly colored by our day-to-day immersion in the "life world," and so no truly rigorous science can be accomplished until we strive to strip away the sedimentary layers of consciousness and analyze the pure phenomenal data themselves, as revealed to our senses free of any reference to pre-supposition. In this way phenomenology strives to be non-assumptive philosophy, a rigorous

science which examines the intentional objects of consciousness by way of eidetic reduction. Further, the post-Cartesian debate between realists, who hold that the essential reality of the external world, and idealists, who claim that "ideas" or "perceptions" or "representations" in the mind are the essential reality, is trivialized by this analysis. In like manner, the subjective-objective, the internal-external question can also be resolved.

These are a growing number of contemporary philosophers who find the above convincing with regard to epistemological grounds for science, but Husserl was also very interested in phenomenology's potential contribution to psychology, and it is here that the phenomenological project has had slower progress. Psychology has seemed unable to embrace phenomenology, as it did not appear that a practical psychology could be phenomenological. In Husserl's *Ideen* (1913), he first expresses the desire that phenomenological philosophy and empirical psychology should be joined in a phenomenological psychology. Now phenomenological psychology was in Husserl's view to remain within the natural attitude, which is our normal reaction to things, as they appear from day-to-day in the life-world. In other words, unlike transcendental phenomenology, phenomenological psychology is not rigorously pre-suppositionless. The existence of a world and objects in it must be assumed in psychology. We are still, however, compelled to reduce psychical experiences to their phenomenal level. In the words of a contemporary phenomenologist:

Phenomenological psychology, as the eidetic and aprioric study of the psychical, is distinguished from the traditional empirical psychology in that phenomenological psychology is interested only in the essence of the psychical phenomena and not in facts purely as such.¹⁸

Yet it has not been clear how phenomenology might operate within the framework of an applied psychology. The discovery that psychodrama and sociometry can easily be understood as therapeutic phenomenology could open up an entirely new dialogue between philosophers and psychologists.

Firstly, what is the essential characteristic of the psychodramatic production? Is it not the reproduction, by the protagonist, of his or her day-to-day life world in a therapeutic environment? The psychodrama director seeks to clarify for the protagonist the essential nature of those everyday ways of being which have become mundane because they have lost their spontaneity. Like the phenomenologist, the psychodramatist is not interested in facts as such, but rather seeks to strip away the layers of everydayness to focus upon the *essence* of the perception. The phenomenologist Paul Piccone refers to this everydayness as "mundane experience" which is "parasitic on the original constitutive experience that generated the conceptual repertory."¹⁹ In this light the careful

and exacting exploration, in action, of the particular relationship in question can be seen as a phenomenological reduction taken to the therapeutic mode.

On the level of theory, both psychodrama and phenomenology understand the individual to be at the center of his perceptual experience and so the creator of the world in which he acts. Indeed the person stands at the locus of the *Wesenschau*, at the center of his intuited essences, for the phenomenologist; in psychodrama, he is the nucleus of his perceived world, about which revolves his social atom and psychodramatic life-world. Even the notion of spontaneity has been hinted at by the phenomenologist. Goldstein's notion of centered and non-centered behavior depicts overly automatic behavior on one extreme and overly ephemeral behavior on the other, making explicit the inadequacy of behavior which ignores the situational context. Merleau-Ponty observed that this notion "is very close to Husserl's *Wesenschau*"²⁰ as we may observe its proximity to the theory of spontaneity.*

Further, the psychodramatic concept of the cultural conserve as the reservoir into which a culture pours its created meanings, and which must be transcended in order for a people to be truly spontaneous, stands compellingly near to Husserl's observations in his *Origin of Geometry*. It was here that he noted that "ideas" are transmitted in to the existent world through their instruments of expression, through "conserves" (the psychodramatic term) like writing, musical scores, and museums. How did Husserl consider it possible to leave the language circle?

Through the "spontaneity of the body," which actually allows us to be conscious of other animated bodies.²¹

Little effort is required to move from here to the theory of the significance of the act itself.

It should be emphasized that transcendental phenomenology can never be psychodrama, because the former is an epistemology with implications for metaphysics, ontology, and science, while psychodrama is a metaphysic and a theory of social science with implications for epistemology. As historically presented by their proponents they come from these different directions, but an exploration of either field is beneficial to an understanding of the other.

Finally, we come to the measurement technique sociometry, also a fundamental aspect of psychodramatic theory. How is sociometry to be understood phenomenologically? Again, if it can be shown that sociometry is a phenomenological enterprise, we may see more clearly why it is embraced by positivists as well as humanists, remembering that phenomenology strives to eliminate the problem at the heart of this dichotomy. The introductory remarks J. L. Moreno makes in *Sociometry, Experimental Method and the Science of Society* indicate a thought process in the formulation of sociometry remarkably similar to Husserl's phenomenological reduction:

*The psychodramatic definition of *spontaneity* is novelty and adequacy of behavior.

My premise before starting to build the theoretical framework of sociometry was to doubt the value of and discard all existing social concepts, not to accept any sociological hypothesis as certain, to start from scratch, to start as if nothing would be known about human and social relations. It was a radical pushing out, from my consciousness at least, all knowledge gained from books and even my own observations.²²

Herbert Spiegelberg, in an article entitled "The Relevance of Phenomenological Philosophy for Psychology,"²³ refers to psychological field theory as an example of "how philosophical phenomenology could become relevant in an area of recent growth in psychology." Spiegelberg goes on to make a fine comparison between the work of Husserl and such theorists as Kurt Lewin, Donal Snygg, Arthur W. Combs, Carl Rogers, and Saul Rosenzweig. The measurement of the relation of the individual to his environment, his "phenomenal field," is a common feature of all these systems. Spiegelberg finds these efforts highly laudatory as the beginnings of phenomenological social science but complains that "thus far there is not further development of the idea, and no concrete idiocosms of specific individuals are described." This, of course, is enough to make the practicing sociometrist turn brilliant colors, for sociometrics not only pre-dates the theories mentioned but goes on to meet the challenge of charting specific inter-subjective phenomenal fields. Significantly, however, the fact that there is already speculation of this kind on these matters leads us to become more confident that sociometry is implicitly a phenomenological sociology.

We have made the following inter-related claims:

- Psychodramatic praxis and at least some aspects of psychodramatic theory are understandable as a phenomenological psychology; and,
- Therefore psychodrama's utilization by humanists and behaviorists is explicable to the degree that phenomenology overcomes the basic theoretical differences of the two schools.

This outline is inordinately brief considering the enormity of the above theses. But the mutual implication of phenomenology and psychodrama becomes particularly evident through a survey of the philosophical objectives of the phenomenological program and the contemporary applications of psychodramatic techniques in the social sciences.

It was, after all, the phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty who made the following remarkably psychodramatic statement:

All humans act and all human creations constitute a single drama, and in this sense we are all saved or lost together. Our lives are essentially universal.²⁴

NOTES

1. *The Philosophy of Descartes*, Haldane and Ross, Trans., London, Cambridge University Press, 1970, pp. 144-157.
2. *Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge*, Karl L. Popper, New York: Harper & Row, 1968, pp. 324-325.
3. *The Ways of Behaviorism*, John B. Watson, New York: W.W. Norton, 1938, p. 7.
4. *The Science of Culture*, Leslie A. White, London: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1949, p. 658.
5. *Die Kris der Europäischen Wissenschaften*, Edmund Husserl, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954.
6. "Reciprocal Inhibition as the Main Basis of Psychotherapeutic Effects," *Behavior Therapy and the Neurosis*, H. J. Eysenck, ed. London: Pergamon Press, 1960, p. 91.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 92.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 92.
9. "Reinforcement and Punishment in the Control of Human Behavior by Social Agencies." C. B. Ferster, *Experiments in Behavior Therapy*, H. J. Eysenck, ed., London, Pergamon Press, 1964, p. 196.
10. *A Primer of Sociometry*, Mary L. Northway, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1952.
11. *Social Pressures in Informal Groups*, Leon Festinger et al., Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1950, p. 133.
12. The irony of this development is further indicated by Moreno's statement in *Who Shall Survive?* (Beacon House, 1934), that "Comte's Hierarchy of the Sciences . . . has become obsolete." Comte, of course, is regarded as the father of positivism.
13. *The Little Community*, Robert Redfield, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967.
14. *Patterns of Discovery in the Social Sciences*, Paul Diesing, New York: Aldine Press, 1971, p. 137.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 141.
16. *Ibid.*, pp. 266-267.
17. *Towards Deep Subjectivity*, Roger Poole, New York: Harper & Row, 1972, p. 132.
18. *Phenomenology*, Joseph J. Kockelmans, ed., New York: Doubleday, 1967, p. 448.
19. *Towards a New Marxism*, "Phenomenological Marxism," Paul Piccone, St. Louis, Missouri: Telos Press, 1973, p. 152.
20. *The Primacy of Perception*, James M. Edie, ed., "An Unpublished Text by Maurice Merleau-Ponty," Arleen B. Dallery, trans., Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 1964, p. 72.
21. *Ibid.*, pp. 83-84.
22. *Sociometry, Experimental Methods and the Science of Society*, J. L. Moreno, Beacon, N.Y.: Beacon House 1951, p. 5.

23. "The Relevance of Phenomenological Philosophy for Psychology," Herbert Spiegelberg, in *Phenomenology and Existentialism*, Lee & Mandelbaum, eds., Baltimore, Md.: The John Hopkins Press, 1967, pp. 219-241.
24. *The Primacy of Perception*, James M. Edie, ed., p. 10.

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